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This article provides a survey of a growing body of empirical evidence that points towards the important
long-term effects that historic events can have on current economic development. The most recent
studies, using micro-level data and more sophisticated identification techniques, have moved beyond
testing whether history matters, and attempt to identify exactly why history matters. The most commonly
examined channels include: institutions, culture, knowledge and technology, and movements between
multiple equilibria. The article concludes with a discussion of the questions that remain and the direct
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In recent years, an exciting new literature has emerged empirically examining whether historic
events are important determinants of economic development today. The origins of this literature
can be traced to three lines of research that began roughly a decade ago. Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997, 2002) examined the importance of factor endowments and colonial rule for the subsequent
economic development of colonies within the Americas. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001,
2002) developed a research agenda that sought to better understand the historical origins of cur-
rent institutions and their importance for long-term economic development. The line of inquiry
undertaken by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) also examined the
importance of colonial rule, but focused on the legal institutions that were transplanted by the
different colonial powers and the long-term consequences this had for investor protection and
ﬁnancial development.
What united these three lines of research, and what made them particulary novel at the time,
was their analysis of the potential importance of a historic event, colonial rule, for long-term eco-
nomic development. These three studies spawned a large literature of empirical studies seeking to
identifytheimportanceofhistoriceventsforeconomicdevelopment. Theearliestsubsequentstud-
ies typically examined correlations between variables quantifying the impact of historic events,
which almost exclusively was colonial rule, and typically the unit of observation was a country.
These initial studies were successful at highlighting correlations in the data consistent with the
notion that history can matter, even in the long-run. However, because of their inability to establish
causality, the evidence presented was suggestive at best.1
Since these early contributions, the literature has developed in a number of signiﬁcant ways.
Much more effort has been put into collecting and compiling new variables based on detailed
historic data. Recent studies, exploiting these richer data sources, are also able to employ much
more satisfying identiﬁcation strategies that typically rely on instrumental variables, falsiﬁcation
tests, regression discontinuities, differences-in-differences estimation, or propensity score match-
ing techniques.2
The literature has also moved beyond simply estimating reduced form causal relationships
1Examples of these early studies include Grier (1999), Englebert (2000a,b), Bertocchi and Canova (2002), and Price
(2003).
2See for example Acemoglu and Johnson (2004), Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Berger (2008), Dell (2008), Feyrer and
Sacerdote (2009), Huillery (2008a), Iyer (2007), Nunn (2008a), Nunn and Qian (2008), and Nunn and Wantchekon (2008).
1between historic events and economic development. For many studies, the goal is to also explain
exactly how and why speciﬁc historic events can continue to matter today. That is, the literature
has moved from asking whether history matters to asking why history matters.3
This paper provides a survey of this body of empirical research. I begin by reviewing the
seminal articles by Acemoglu et al. (2001), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002), and La Porta et al.
(1997, 1998) as well as the body of literature that each contribution has generated. The next section
reviews the additional evidence from second generation studies that provide identiﬁcation-based
evidence that history matters. Section 4 then surveys the precise channels of causality that have
been examined in the literature. The evidence for the importance of (i) multiple equilibria and path
dependence; (ii) domestic institutions; (iii) cultural norms of behavior; and (iv) knowledge and
technology are examined. The penultimate section of the paper, section 5, discusses the interesting
relationship between geography and history that has developed in the literature. While some
studies have pitted these two factors against each other as alternative determinants of economic
development, other studies have shown that the two factors interact in interesting and important
ways. As will be discussed, the existing body of evidence indicates that the greatest effect that
geography has on economic development is through its inﬂuence on history. The ﬁnal section of
the paper, section 6, concludes by discussing the current direction of future research.
2. The Seminal Contributions
The literature linking history to economic development has its origins in three distinct but related
strands of research: Acemoglu et al. (2001); La Porta et al. (1997, 1998); and Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997, 2002). All three examine one of the largest and most important events in the world’s history:
European expansion and colonization of the globe, which began in the 16th century.
The studies document the lasting impact that Europe’s colonization had on the development
paths of former colonies. They also share a common view that an important part of the causal
mechanism was the impact that colonial rule had on the domestic institutions that persisted after
independence.4 Viewed in this light, all three lines of research are conceptually consistent with
one another. All three argue that the institutions of a society are an important determinant of long-
3See for example Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005a) Acemoglu and Johnson (2004), Becker and Woessmann
(2009), Dell (2008), Iyer (2007), Munshi and Wilson (2008), Nunn (2008b), Nunn and Qian (2008), and Nunn and
Wantchekon (2008).
4The studies build on an even earlier literature arguing for the importance of domestic institutions for long-term
growth. See for example North and Thomas (1973) and North (1981, 1990). More recently, also see Greif (2006).
2term economic development, and that historical events can be an important determinant of the
evolution and long-term persistence of domestic institutions. Where the studies differ, however,
is in their views of which aspects of colonial rule were crucial for shaping institutions, and in the
speciﬁcs of the proposed causal mechanisms.
For La Porta et al., the identity of the colonizer determined whether a civil law or common
law legal system was established and this was important for long-term development. Unlike La
Porta et al., Engerman and Sokoloff and Acemoglu et al. share the common view that it is the
characteristics of the region being colonized that were crucial factors that determined the effect
of colonial rule on long-term economic development. For Acemoglu et al., the initial disease
environment shaped the extent to which secure property rights were established in the colony, and
through their persistence these initial institutions had a large effect on long-term economic devel-
opment. Engerman and Sokoloff focus on the importance of a region’s endowment of geography
suitable for growing lucrative globally traded cash crops that were best cultivated using large scale
plantations and slave labor. These large plantations resulted in economic and political inequality,
which in turn impeded the development of institutions that promoted commercial interests and
long-term economic growth.
We now examine the three seminal contributions, as well as the resulting literature that has
been generated by each.
A. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
The core of La Porta et al.’s (1997, 1998) analysis is their emphasis on the differences between legal
systems based on British common law versus Roman civil law. They argue that countries with
legal systems based on British common law offer greater investor protection relative to countries
with legal systems based on civil law. They then recognize that in British colonies common law
based legal systems were transplanted, while the European countries with a legal system based on
Roman civil law – namely Spain, France, and Portugal – transplanted civil law legal systems. La
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) use this historic fact to examine the causal effect of the strength of legal rules
protecting investor rights on ﬁnancial development. The authors argue that for former colonies
legal origin is largely exogenous to country characteristics and is therefore a potential instrument
that can be used to estimate the effect of the protection of investor rights on ﬁnancial development.
The ﬁrst stage of their IV estimates show that civil law countries, relative to common law countries,
3do have better investor protection, and their second stage estimates indicate that countries with
weaker investor protection have smaller debt and equity markets.
Since these initial studies a large literature has emerged exploring the potential effect that legal
origin may have on other factors.5 These studies show that legal origin is also correlated with a
host of other country characteristics, such as military conscription (Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005a,b),
labor market regulation (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004), contract en-
forcement (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003, Acemoglu and Johnson, 2004),
comparative advantage (Nunn, 2007b), and even economic growth (Mahoney, 2001). These results
are both good and bad for La Porta et al.’s (1997, 1998) initial studies. They suggest that legal origin
may have effects that are even more wide-ranging than originally assumed in La Porta et al. (1997,
1998). However, if this is the case, then this calls into question the validity their use of legal origin
as an instrument for investor protection. Given that legal origin appears to be correlated with a
host of other country characteristics that may also affect ﬁnancial development, it is unlikely that
the exclusion restrictions from their original papers are satisﬁed. As discussed in La Porta et al.
(2008), the authors are clearly aware of this fact.
Subsequent studies also look for similar relationships involving legal origin within the United
States. Ten U.S. states that were ﬁrst settled by either France, Spain, or Mexico initially developed
civil law legal systems.6 Berkowitz and Clay (2005, 2006) ﬁnd that today these civil law states have
a less independent judiciaries, lower quality courts, and less stable constitutions. Although both
studies rely on OLS estimates, they do show that the correlations remain robust to controlling for a
number of additional factors, such as slavery, date of entry into the Union, state size, and climatic
characteristics.
Other studies also highlight correlations in the data and show that there exists a relationship
between the identify of the colonizer and various measures of long-term economic development.
For example, Grier (1999) ﬁnds that at independence former British colonies on average had a
larger share of their populations in school. Bertocchi and Canova (2002) ﬁnd that within Africa,
former British and French colonies have higher levels of investment and education after indepen-
dence. Although these correlations do not provide proof of the causal importance of the identity of
5La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) provide a survey of these early studies as well as the subsequent
literature that they generated.
6The ten states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Mexico, and Texas. Of these states only Louisiana continues to have a civil law legal system.
4colonizer, they are consistent with La Porta et al.’s emphasis on the impact that the identity of the
colonizer (speciﬁcally, its legal system) has on the long-term economic development of its colony.
B. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
Like La Porta et al. (1997), Acemoglu et al. (2001) also examine the effect of colonial rule on the
institutions that were implemented and their long-term impact on economic development. How-
ever, Acemoglu et al. (2001) focus on a different determinant of the differences in institutions that
evolved across former colonies. They hypothesize that since colonies with a less deadly disease
environment had greater European settlement, in these colonies growth promoting institutions
thatprotectedpropertyrightswereestablishedduringcolonialrule. IncoloniesinwhichEuropean
mortality was high and settlement low, the colonizers did not have an incentive to establish strong
property rights and instead established extractive rent-seeking institutions. Using this logic, the
authors estimate the causal effect of current domestic institutions on per capita income, using early
European mortality rates as an instrument for institutions. One of the assumptions underlying the
IV strategy is that initial settler mortality is not correlated with current income other than through
domestic institutions. In the ﬁrst stage of their IV procedure, the authors ﬁnd a strong negative
relationship between initial settler mortality and institutional quality today. The second stage
estimates indicate that domestic institutions exert a strong positive effect on per capita income.
The elegance of the paper lies in its ability to develop a clear and convincing historical narrative
with supporting empirical evidence and show how a historic event can affect past institutions,
which through their persistence have an inﬂuence on income levels today. The study provided
an empirical foundation to support the seminal works on the importance of institutions written
by North and Thomas (1973) and North (1981, 1990).7 The study emerged at a time when the
literature was still in the process of trying to convincingly estimate the causal impact of domestic
institutions on economic development.8 An important contribution of Acemoglu et al. (2001) was
to develop a much more satisfying identiﬁcation strategy than previous empirical studies.
A number of studies have attempted to extend Acemoglu et al.’s line of research, providing
evidence for the importance of historic institutions for current economic development. Two recent
studies by Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Dell (2008), rather than taking a broader more macro
7More recently, also see Greif (2006).
8Early papers in this literature include DeLong and Shleifer (1993), Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Hall and
Jones (1999) and Englebert (2000a,b).
5perspective, focus on a speciﬁc regions. By doing this, the authors are able to collect and analyze
much richer data at a more micro level. The use of this richer data also allow the authors to
employ additional estimation strategies that help identify the causal effects of history on economic
outcomes today.
Dell (2008) examines the mita forced labor system, which was instituted by the Spanish in Peru
and Bolivia between 1573 and 1812. The study combines contemporary household survey data,
geographic data, and data from historic record, and uses a regression discontinuity estimation
strategy to identify the long-term impacts of the mita system. Her identiﬁcation exploits the fact
that there was a discrete change in the boundaries of the mita conscription area and that other
relevant factors likely vary smoothly around the mita boundary. Because of this, comparing the
outcomes of mita and non-mita districts very close to the border provides an unbiased estimate
of the long-term effects of the mita. The study ﬁnds that the mita system had an adverse effect
on long-term economic development. All else equal, today former mita districts have an average
level of household consumption that is 32% lower than households in former non-mita districts.
The study ﬁnds that a signiﬁcant proportion of the difference can be explained by lower levels of
education and less developed road networks. Dell’s study provides valuable evidence showing
that the institutions established during colonial rule can have long-term impacts that continue to
be felt today.
Like Dell (2008), Banerjee and Iyer (2005) also analyze the long-term effects of colonial insti-
tutions, but examine differences in revenue collection institutions across districts within colo-
nial India. The authors compare districts where revenue was historically collected directly by
British ofﬁcials to districts where revenue was collected by native landlords. They ﬁnd that after
independence districts with non-landlord systems have higher levels of health, education, and
agricultural technology investments relative to landlord systems. To determine the extent to which
the correlation is causal, the authors exploit the fact that in the parts of India conquered between
1820 and 1856, non-landlord revenue collection was implemented. They argue that the historic
reasons for this pattern are orthogonal to district characteristics and therefore the date of British
conquer can be used as an instrument for the revenue collection system. Their IV estimates are
consistent with their OLS estimates. They also show that their OLS results are robust when the
sample is restricted to 35 districts, in which all landlord districts are bordered by non-landlord
districts.
6Although the analysis of Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Dell (2008) provide evidence of the long-
term impacts of initial colonial institutions, the studies do differ from Acemoglu et al. (2001) since
the transmission mechanism is not the persistence of these initially implemented institutions. In
Dell, the hypothesized mechanism is the concentration of wealth and power, and the resulting
provision of public goods. Similarly, in Banerjee and Iyer’s analysis the transmission mechanism
is not through the persistence of these initially implemented institutions, since the differences in
colonial land revenue collection systems no longer exist.
One study that does empirically link early colonial institutions to institutional outcomes today
is sociologist Matthew Lange’s (2004) analysis of the differential effects of indirect rule relative to
direct rule on the quality of institutions and governance today. Using colonial documents housed
in Britain’s Public Records Ofﬁce, Lange compiles information on court cases held in 33 former
British colonies in 1955. He then uses the fraction of the court cases that were presided over
by local chiefs, rather than colonial ofﬁcials, as a measure of the extent of indirect rule in each
country. The measure is intended to provide a proxy for the overall extent to which colonial rule
in the country relied on traditional legal, political, and institutional structures. The study ﬁnds a
positive relationship between the extent of indirect rule and a variety of measures of institutional
quality and good governance. The primary shortcoming of the study, however, lies in its lack
of a convincing identiﬁcation strategy. Because the paper relies on OLS estimates it is unknown
whether the correlations between past and current institutions capture the causal effect of historic
institutions on institutions today or simply reﬂect a spurious correlation driven by omitted country
characteristics.
C. Engerman and Sokoloff
The studies by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) focus on the differential paths of development
among the New World countries of the Americas.9 Engerman and Sokoloff argue that the different
development experiences of the countries in the Americas can be explained by initial differences in
endowments of land and geography suitable for growing globally traded crops like sugar, which
were best grown on large-scale plantations using slave labor. These areas were characterized
by severe economic and political inequality, which resulted in the subsequent evolution of the
domesticinstitutionsthatprotectedtheprivilegesoftheelitesandrestrictedtheparticipationofthe
9For a review and discussion of these and related studies see Hoff (2003).
7rest of the population in the commercial economy. In former Spanish colonies endowments of rich
mineral resources further strengthened the tendency towards political and economic inequality.
Since the analysis of Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) is primarily qualitative in nature,
the literature has taken the natural next step, which is to begin to empirically examine the core
predictions that arise from their analysis. A number of studies have uncovered correlations in the
data that support the authors’ hypothesis that slavery was detrimental for subsequent economic
development. The studies ﬁnd a negative relationship between various measures of economic
development and past slave use, looking across U.S. states (Mitchener and McLean, 2003) or
counties (Lagerlöf, 2005) or across New World countries (Nunn, 2008b).
Studies have also examined additional hypotheses that arise from their study. Nunn (2008b)
uses information from the 1860 U.S. Census to examine whether the data support the inequality
channel proposed by Engerman and Sokoloff. The study, based on OLS estimates, ﬁnds a strong
positive relationship between slavery and inequality in the size of land holdings, when looking
across either states or counties. This ﬁnding is consistent with the notion that slavery resulted
in economic inequality. However, Nunn fails to ﬁnd any evidence of an empirical relationship
between initial economic inequality and current income levels. Although it is true that the counties
and states with higher levels of land inequality in 1860 also have higher levels of income inequality
today, it is not true that these states and counties have lower levels of income today.10 In other
words, there is no evidence of a relationship between historic inequality and current economic
underdevelopment as hypothesized by Engerman and Sokoloff. Instead, the data are most consis-
tent with slavery having had two unrelated consequences. It increased economic inequality, which
persists today, and it also resulted in lower levels of economic development.
Nunn (2008b) also looks outside of the U.S. to examine the inequality channel proposed by
Engerman and Sokoloff. Speciﬁcally, he examines their argument that slavery was detrimental
because it took the form of large-scale plantation slavery, which promoted extreme inequality. Us-
ing data from British Slave Registrars, Nunn disaggregates slave populations into those that were
used on plantations and those that worked in other occupations such as industry, livestock, salt,
timber, ﬁshing, and shipping. In a second exercise, Nunn does something similar, disaggregating
slave populations by the size of the holdings that they were held on. By doing this he is able to
10Related to this is Frankema’s (2006) ﬁnding of a positive relationship between colonial land inequality and post-
colonial income inequality across former colonies.
8examine whether the negative correlation between slavery and economic development is being
driven by large-scale plantation slavery. He ﬁnds that this is not the case. All forms of slavery are
negatively correlated with subsequent economic development, and when statistically signiﬁcant
differences in the estimates exist, large-scale plantation slavery is found to be less correlated with
underdevelopment than smaller-scale non-plantation slavery.
Additional evidence on the validity of Engerman and Sokoloff’s hypothesized inequality chan-
nel comes from the study by Acemoglu, Bautista, Querubin, and Robinson (2008) that examines
variation across municipalities within the state of Cundinamarca, Colombia. The analysis shows
that within Cundinamarca there is a positive relationship between 19th century land inequality
and current economic development proxied by measures of primary and secondary school enroll-
ment rates. This relationship is opposite to the negative relationship that one would expect to
observe if Engerman and Sokoloff’s hypothesis was correct. This ﬁnding can also be contrasted
to evidence from the United States showing that until 1940 there was a negative relationship
between inequality and education (Galor, Moav, and Vollrath, 2009). The study also shows that
in Cundinamarca economic inequality and political inequality are negatively correlated, a fact that
also runs counter to Engerman and Sokoloff’s hypothesis that initial economic inequality resulted
in political inequality.
Additional evidence can be gleaned from Melissa Dell’s (2008) study of colonial Peru and Bo-
livia. In her analysis, Dell explains her ﬁnding of a negative effect of the mita system on education
and the development of road networks by the fact that in mita districts the colonial government
restricted the formation of large Spanish land holdings, called haciendas. Because the large land
owners typically lobbied for the greater provision of public goods, the non-mita districts, without
these large land owners, had lower levels of public goods. Dell provides empirical evidence to
support her argument. Comparing districts on both sides of the mita boundary, one observes
a signiﬁcantly lower presence of haciendas in former non-mita districts both during and after
the mita, as well less dense road networks and less market integration today. These estimates
support her explanation that because non-mita districts had less haciendas, they did not have large
landowners that were able to lobby for local public goods. Dell’s explanation and her supporting
evidence run contrary to the inequality channel put forth by Engerman and Sokoloff. In Dell’s
setting, not enough (rather than too much) concentration and inequality in land ownership, was
the cause of long-term economic underdevelopment.
93. Additional Evidence that History Matters
Much of the early literature examining the importance of history for economic development exam-
ined correlations between different measures of colonial rule and current economic performance
across countries (Grier, 1999, Englebert, 2000a,b, Bertocchi and Canova, 2002, Price, 2003). Al-
though these studies are useful in highlighting correlations that exist in the data, they stop short
of providing causal evidence of the effect of history on long-term development. The more recent
empirical studies at the forefront of this literature combine much richer data, typically at a level of
analysis much ﬁner than the country, with much more sophisticated identiﬁcation techniques to
provide causal evidence of the importance of history for long-term economic development.
One example of this line of research is Huillery’s (2008a) analysis of the differential effects of
colonial rule across districts within French West Africa. Her study combines data from historic
documents from archives in Paris and Dakar with household surveys from the 1990s. She shows
that looking across districts there is a positive relationship between early colonial investments in
education, health and infrastructure and current levels of schooling, health outcomes, and access
to electricity, water, and fuel. The study then moves to testing for the causal effect of colonial
policy on these subsequent outcome measures. Exploiting the richness of her district level data
set, Huillery uses a regression discontinuity estimation strategy, comparing the differences in her
outcomes of interest between neighboring districts only. Her estimates provide strong support that
colonial investments on education, health and infrastructure have positive and persistent effects
on current education, health, and infrastructure.
Like Huillery (2008a), the recent study by Berger (2008) also uses micro-level data to identify
long-term impacts of colonial policies. The study also uses a regression discontinuity estimation
strategyandexaminesthedifferenceinoutcomesbetweenNorthernNigeriaandSouthernNigeria,
two regions of colonial Nigeria. During colonial rule the two districts were split by a straight line
running East-West located at 7◦100 N. Although there were many differences between the two
regions, one of the primary differences was the form of taxation. In the coastal Southern region
revenue was raised primarily through tariffs on internationally traded goods. The landlocked
North relied on a poll tax to raise revenue. As a result, in the North it was necessary to develop
an institutional structure and network to collect taxes, and to develop mechanisms to control
corruption and incompetence of government ofﬁcials and native chiefs.
10Berger uses vaccination rates as his measure of local government quality today. Comparing
households within 1 degree on either side of the historic border between Northern and Southern
Nigeria, he ﬁnds that vaccination rates are signiﬁcantly lower on the Northern side of the border.
A falsiﬁcation test shows that there is something distinct about the historic border located at 7◦100
N. As one moves the border north or south, the estimates ﬁnd no difference in vaccination rates
of households on either side of the false borders. It is only for this historic border, which does not
correspond to any modern boundary, that a signiﬁcant difference exists.
Other studies, using more sophisticated identiﬁcation techniques, have revisited old questions
that were never satisfactorily answered in the early literature. One of these questions is the effect
that the length of colonial rule had on subsequent development. This question has been examined
previously by Grier (1999) and Price (2003), but their analysis relies on OLS estimates. Feyrer and
Sacerdote (2009) use a novel instrumental variables estimation strategy to provides the ﬁrst causal
estimates of the impact of the length of colonial rule. The authors, as part of their identiﬁcation
strategy, consider only former island colonies. They argue that how early an island was discovered
was determined in part by its location relative to prevailing wind patterns and that these wind
patterns most likely do not affect long-term development through channels other than through
the island’s date of discovery. If this is the case, then the wind vectors surrounding an island can
be used as instruments to estimate the causal effect of the length of colonial rule on subsequent
development. Their baseline set of instruments, which are constructed from satellite imagery data
reported monthly on a 1 degree by 1 degree global grid, include the annual mean and variance of
monthly East-West wind vectors.
Their ﬁrst stage estimates show that stronger westerly winds are associated with earlier dis-
covery and more years under colonial rule. According to their second stage estimates, the length
of colonial rule has a positive effect on per capita income in 2000. This result may seem surpris-
ing since it appears to provide evidence that colonial rule was good for economic development.
However, this conclusion does not follow from their study. Because the estimated effects are for
the length of colonial rule conditional on being colonized, it does not provide an estimate of the
average effect of being colonized relative to not being colonized.
A second long-standing question that has recently been revisited with improved identiﬁcation
is the long-term effect of direct colonial rule relative to indirect rule. The distinction between direct
and indirect rule, although not always clear-cut, lies in the amount of bureaucratic responsibility
11given to native agents rather than European administrators. Direct rule occurs when only the
lowest levels of responsibility are given to natives and all other positions are occupied by Euro-
peans. Under indirect rule, much more power is given to natives, and typically local governance
structures and local elites are integrated into the colonial governance structure.
The recent study by Iyer (2007) employs an empirically persuasive identiﬁcation strategy to
examine the relative effects of direct versus indirect rule across regions within India. She addresses
the problem of the endogeneity of the form of British rule by exploiting the ‘Doctrine of Lapse’,
whichwasinplacebetween1848and1856. Thedoctrine, whichstatedthatanativeruler’sadopted
heirs were not to be recognized by the British government, allowed the British to annex several
states where the native ruler died without a natural heir. Exploiting the Doctrine of Lapse, Iyer
constructs a district speciﬁc indicator variable that equals one if the ruler died without a natural
heir between 1848 and 1856 when the Doctrine of Lapse was in place.11
Looking across 415 districts, Iyer estimates the effect of colonial indirect and direct rule on
investment in agriculture and agricultural productivity today. She ﬁrst estimates the relationship
using OLS and ﬁnds a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between direct rule on
agricultural investments and productivity. On the other hand, her IV estimates report no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant difference between the two types of districts. The difference between the IV and
OLS estimates is consistent with the British selectively annexing the most productive states. Iyer
(2007) also examines the effect of direct rule on the availability of public goods such as health,
education, and roads. Again she ﬁnds that the IV estimates are consistently lower than the OLS
estimates, which again is consistent with the British selecting the ‘better’ states. According to the
IV estimates, direct rule exerted a negative effect on the long-term availability of public goods.12
As is always the case with IV estimates, the validity of the estimates rests crucially on whether
the instruments satisfy the necessary exclusion restrictions. As a test of the validity of her instru-
ments, Iyer performs a number of falsiﬁcation tests. She ﬁrst reports the reduced form relationship
between her instrument and her measures of the availability of public goods. Consistent with
the IV estimates, her reduced form shows a statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship between
her instrument and the public goods measures. Iyer then constructs a ‘fake instrument’, which
is an indicator variable that equals one if a state’s ruler died without a natural heir between 1858
11In her analysis, Iyer only considers the subset of states that were not annexed before 1848.
12Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan (2005) examine the robustness of this result across 27 different public good mea-
sures. Overall, the results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Iyer (2007) looking across a more restricted range of public goods.
12and 1884, a period when the Doctrine of Lapse was no longer in place. According to the channel
proposed by Iyer, the results with the fake instrument should not provide the same reduced form
estimates as with the actual instruments. This is exactly what she ﬁnds. For all outcome measures
except one, she ﬁnds no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the fake instrument and the
outcome measures.
One of the most dramatic examples of how history can shape long-term economic development
comes from Nunn’s (2008a) study of the impact that the external trade in slaves had on long-
term political and economic development within Africa. Combining data from historic shipping
records, reporting the total number of slaves shipped on each voyage from Africa, with historic
records that report the ethnic identity of the slaves being shipped, Nunn constructs estimates of
the number of slaves shipped during the trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. He also constructs similar
estimates for Africa’s three other slave trades: the Indian Ocean, Red Sea and trans-Saharan slave
trades. The study ﬁnds that the parts of Africa from which the largest number of slaves were taken
(normalized by land area or historic population) today are the poorest parts of Africa. The core
issue in interpreting this correlation is selection into the slave trades. If, for example, the societies
with the most poorly functioning institutions and the poorest future growth prospects selected
into the slave trades, then this would explain the negative relationship even if the external trade in
slave trades had no direct impact on the societies within Africa.
Nunn tests whether selection is driving the results by looking at the evidence on the nature of
selection during the slave trades. He ﬁnds that the descriptive and quantitative evidence suggest
that it was not the least developed societies that selected into the slave trade. Instead, it was
actually the more developed and more densely populated societies that supplied the largest num-
bers of slaves. Nunn also constructs instruments based on the distance of each country from the
external locations of demand for the slaves. The key identiﬁcation assumption is that the location
of demand inﬂuenced the location of supply and not vice versa. If, as Sokoloff and Engerman
(2000) argue, the demand for slaves was determined primarily by geographic characteristics, such
as soil quality suitable for plantation agriculture, then this assumption is reasonable. The IV
estimates provide estimates that is consistent with the OLS estimates. Overall, Nunn concludes
that the empirical evidence suggest that Africa’s external trade in slaves did have a signiﬁcant
negative impact on the subsequent economic development of the regions within Africa.
134. Why History Matters
A. Multiple Equilibria and Path Dependence
If one thinks about classical models in economics, it far from obvious why historic events should
have any impact in the long-run. For example, in the classic Solow model, for a given set of
parameter values, there is a unique steady state level of capital and income per worker. Any event
that shocks either capital or output has a temporary impact only. In the long-run the economy
eventually converges back to a unique steady state equilibrium. Viewed in this light, it is unclear
why history should matter. However, once models with multiple equilibria are considered, then
historiceventshavepermanenteffectsiftheycauseamovementfromoneequilibriumtoanother.13
A recent paper by Nunn (2007a) illustrates this point by developing a model that features
multiple equilibria in the security of property rights and output per worker. It is then shown that
a period of severe extraction, by temporarily causing the optimal equilibrium to disappear, can
cause a permanent movement to an equilibrium with signiﬁcantly lower income levels. Because
this equilibrium is stable, the society remains ‘stuck’ in this equilibrium even after the high-income
equilibrium returns. Using historic evidence, Nunn argues that the movement from one equi-
librium to another explains why in Africa the slave trade and colonial rule appear to have had
permanent impacts.
On many levels, it is clear that the world we live in is ﬁlled with multiple equilibria. Suggestive
evidence of this fact can be found in a variety of real world phenomena, such as the fact that this
article was typed on a QWERTY keyboard rather than the signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient DVORAK
keyboard14 or the fact that cars are driven on the right hand-side of the road in the U.S., but on the
left side in the UK. As well, historic events, such as the battle for market dominance between VHS
and Betamax in the 1980s, also provide further evidence that multiple equilibria exist.
Very recently, a number of studies have undertaken the task of testing empirically for the
existence of multiple equilibria. One strategy that some of studies have employed is to examine
cases where there has been an extremely large shock to an equilibrium. The studies then test
whether the shock causes a movement from the previous equilibrium to a new equilibrium. Davis
13For early examples of models of this type see Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993), Acemoglu (1995), and Mehlum,
Moene, and Torvik (2003).
14For a discussion of the historic reasons for the adoption of the QWERTY keyboard see David (1985).
14and Weinstein (2008) examine the effect of bombings on 114 Japanese cities during World War II.15
The authors ﬁnd that after the bombings, the cities returned to their pre-bombing populations,
regainedtheir sharesin totalmanufacturing output, and mostsurprisingly, theyalso regainedtheir
pre-existing industrial composition. Overall, the results point towards the existence of a unique
stable equilibrium of production, rather than the existence of multiple equilibria. A similar result
is found in Miguel and Roland’s (2006) analysis of the long-term effects of the U.S. bombings in
Vietnam. The authors ﬁnd that the bombings had no long-term effects on populations, poverty or
consumption 25 years later.
These tests, although very suggestive, do not provide airtight proof against the existence of
multiple equilibria in these environments. This is true for a number of reasons. It is possible
that other equilibria exist, but the shocks were not large enough to cause a movement to a new
equilibrium. It is also possible that the shocks were large enough to cause a movement, but that the
pre-bombing equilibrium is focal and therefore after the bombings this equilibrium was selected
among all possible equilibria (see Schelling, 1960).
An innovative study by Redding, Sturm, and Wolf (2007) tests for the existence of multiple
equilibria in an environment very different from Davis and Weinstein (2008) and Miguel and
Roland (2006). The study examines the location of airport hubs in Germany before and after the
division of Germany following World War II. It is shown that after division, the location of West
Germany’s primary airport hub switched from Berlin to Frankfurt. After reuniﬁcation in 1990, the
location of the hub did not switch back to Berlin. Redding et al. show that this shift cannot be
explained by changes in fundamentals over the time period. Thus, the evidence suggests that the
temporary division of Germany resulted in a permanent movement of the location of Germany’s
largest airport hub.
One of the most dramatic examples of how a historic event can drastically alter the subsequent
path of economic development is the history of Tasmania. According to archaeological evidence,
humans ﬁrst arrived in what today is Tasmania as early as 22,000 years ago across a land bridge
that connected present day Australia to Tasmania. Approximately 12,000 years ago, at the end of
the Pleistocene, rising sea levels drowned the land bridge, turning it into what is now the shallow
Bass Straight (Diamond, 1978). The archeological evidence indicates that the technologies used by
the Tasmanians deteriorated over time. The Tasmanians lost their ability to construct bone tools,
15See also Davis and Weinstein (2002) which was a precursor to this paper.
15make cold-weather clothing, and to catch ﬁsh.
An explanation for Tasmania’s dramatic deterioration has been put forth by Anthropologist
Joseph Henrich (2004). He develops a model where skills are imperfectly transmitted from the
most skillful or successful individual in the society to all other members of the society. Henrich
shows that in this environment the size of the population matters. This is because in a larger
population the most skilled individual is, on average, more skilled. He also shows that because
of imperfect transmission, there exists a minimum population size below which the average skill
of the society actually decreases over time. Therefore, his model explains the Tasmanian technol-
ogy losses by the drop in effective population size after rising sea levels isolated Tasmania from
Australia.
TheTasmanianexperienceprovidesadramaticexampleofpathdependence. Onehistoricevent
– the rising sea levels and ﬂooding of the Bass Straight – resulted in a permanent change in the
evolutionary process and moved the society to a new trajectory, where technologies and skills
deteriorated over time. One historic event permanently changed, in a very dramatic way, the
long-term social and economic development of the Tasmanians.
B. Domestic Institutions
Even without the existence of multiple equilibria, historic events can still affect economic devel-
opment in the long-run if they alter deep determinants of long-term economic growth. The deep
determinant that has received the greatest attention in the literature is domestic institutions. The
emphasis on institutions can be seen clearly from the fact that in each of the seminal papers by
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002), and La Porta et al. (1997, 1998)
the mechanism through which colonial rule affects current development is domestic institutions.
The focus on institutions as a causal mechanism has also continued in subsequent research.
An example of this is Acemoglu et al.’s (2005a) study of the effect that early Atlantic trade had
in Europe. The authors argue that in countries with access to the lucrative Atlantic three corner
trade, economic and political power shifted towards commercial interests. As the merchant class
became more powerful, they were able alter domestic institutions to protect their interests against
theinterestsoftheroyalty, andtheseinstitutionalchangesinturnhadapositiveeffectonlong-term
prosperity. Using data on historic urbanization rates and per capita incomes, the study ﬁrst shows
16that the rise of Europe was actually a rise of the nations with access to the lucrative Atlantic trade.16
Their explanation is shown to be robust even when controlling for alternative explanations of the
rise of Western Europe, such as the rise of a Protestant work ethic (Weber, 1930, Landes, 1998), war
and inter-state competition (Tilly, 1990), and the legacy of the Roman Empire.17
The authors argue that proﬁts alone are not able to explain the divergent growth of Atlantic
traders and that the evolution of domestic institutions played an important role in the process.18
To test this hypothesis, the authors extend the Polity IV data back to 1350 and show that Atlantic
trade increased the quality of domestic institutions as measured by an index of the constraints on
the executive. They further hypothesize that the process of institutional change could only occur
in countries that initially had non-absolutist political institutions. They show that the data is also
consistent with this. They show that the increase in economic growth generated by the Atlantic
trade was higher for countries with better initial domestic institutions, again measured by the
constraint on the executive.
The recent study by Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) also provides evidence of the persistence
of domestic institutions, but within the African context. The authors use ethnographic data to
construct a measure of the level of state development in pre-colonial African societies. Their OLS
estimates show that there is a positive correlation between pre-colonial political development and
the provision of public goods today. This result can be combined with evidence from Nunn (2008a)
showing that the parts of Africa from which more slaves were taken had less developed political
systems after the slave trade (and before ofﬁcial colonial rule). Because the evidence for both
relationships is based on correlations in the data, one must be cautious when drawing conclusions.
However, the combined evidence from Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) and Nunn (2008a) is consistent
with a chain of causality where the slave trade resulted in a deterioration of domestic political
institutions, which in turn had a long-term adverse impact on the provision of public goods.
Therefore, the evidence from the two studies provides support for the notion that history can
matter through the evolution and persistence of early institutions.
16These countries were Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
17More recently, Becker and Woessmann (2009) also provide empirical support for the importance of the Protestant
religion, but focuses instead on the religion’s emphasis on the importance of literacy so that each individual was able to
read the Bible. The analysis identiﬁes a positive effect of the Protestant religion on literacy and industrialization in 19th
century Prussia. (Also related is the evidence put forth by Iyigun (2008) showing that the rise of the Ottoman Empire
and its movement into Europe is partly responsible for the Protestant Reformation.)
18See Inikori (2002) for the alternative view that the proﬁts that accrued to Western Europe during the three corner
Atlantic trade explains much of its growth during the time.
17The persistence of historically determined institutions is also the channel of causality in the
recent study by Saumitra Jha (2008) that examines the effect of early medieval trade on the for-
mation and persistence of institutions promoting religious tolerance. The study by Jha shows that
when looking across cities within India, one ﬁnds a positive relationship between participation
in overseas trade during the medieval period and religious conﬂict during the late 19th and
early 20th centuries. Jha addresses the endogeneity of the selection of medieval ports by using
the existence of natural harbors as an instrument for whether a coastal city was a trading port
and by using propensity score matching techniques. His estimates show that being a town that
was a medieval trading port made it less likely that the town later experienced Hindu-Muslim
riots. Using historical evidence, Jha argues that because Muslims provided access to the markets
of the Middle East, in the towns connected to this overseas trade the returns to Hindu-Muslim
cooperation was much higher. As a result, institutions that supported exchange and a peaceful
coexistence between Hindus and Muslims were developed. Although Jha’s analysis provides
evidence of a causal effect of medieval trade on long-term religious tolerance, it stops short of
verifying empirically that the intervening channel is the persistence of historic institutions.
A number of studies also provide suggestive evidence of the importance of historic institutions.
Rather than empirically documenting the evolution and persistence of institutions over time,
they show that historic institutions have a strong effect on economic outcomes today. Examples
include Dell’s (2008) analysis of the impact of the early forced labor institutions in colonial Peru
and Bolivia, as well as Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005, 2008) studies of the effects of early land tenure
institutions in colonial India.
Overall, the literature since Acemoglu et al. (2001) has succeeded at providing additional evi-
dence showing that institutions are an important channel through which history matters. How-
ever, much work remains to be done before we have a clear understanding of the effect that
historic events have on the formation or early institutions and their persistence and importance
for long-term development. For example, in past studies (typically at the macro-level) institutions
have been conceptualized and measured as a broad cluster of institutions. The result of this is
that by and large institutions have remained a black box that we do not clearly understand the
details of. As empirical research continues to examine speciﬁc examples of institutional change
and persistence at the micro-level, our understanding of the causes and consequences of speciﬁc
institutions will naturally improve.
18The recent study by Acemoglu and Johnson (2004) directly tackles the task of unpacking the
black box we call institutions. The authors make a distinction between two broad clusters of insti-
tutionsthattheyrefertoas“propertyrightsinstitutions”and“contractinginstitutions”. According
to their deﬁnitions, property rights institutions protects individuals from theft or expropriation by
the government or elites, and contracting institutions enforce private contracts written between
individuals. The study explores the historical determinants of both types of institutions. They
show that although there is a strong relationship between a country’s legal origin and the quality
of its contracting environment today,19 legal origin is not correlated with measures of property
rights institutions. Extending previous research by Acemoglu et al. (2001), the study shows that
there is a strong correlation between initial European settler mortality rates and property rights
institutions, but no correlation between settler mortality and contracting institutions.
To unbundle the effects of these different types of institutions on economic outcomes, the
authors use legal origin as an instrument for contracting institutions and initial settler mortality as
an instrument for property rights institutions.20 Using this IV procedure, the authors estimate the
effect of both types of institutions on three outcome variables: current income, investment, ﬁnan-
cial development, and the form of ﬁnancial intermediation (i.e. equity versus debt contracts). They
ﬁnd that property rights institutions have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on income, investment
and ﬁnancial development. On the other had, contracting institutions appear to have a much more
limited impact, only affecting the form of ﬁnancial intermediation.
C. Cultural Norms of Behavior
Another way in which historic events can have long-term impacts is if these past events per-
manently affect culture or norms of behavior. Although in economics the notion of culture is
often batted around with little meaning, in other disciplines culture is often given much more
content.21 For example, evolutionary anthropologists have long recognized that there are clear
micro-foundations that explain the existence of a phenomenon like culture (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman, 1981, Boyd and Richerson, 1985). If information acquisition is either imperfect or
19This is consistent with the previous ﬁndings of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), Djankov
et al. (2003) and Lerner and Schoar (2005).
20Motivated by Acemoglu et al. (2002), the authors also use initial population density in 1500 as an alternative
instrument for property rights institutions.
21This is not to say that there are not serious studies in economics that seek to understand and model in a concrete
way culture and its transmission. Examples include Verdier (2000, 2001) and Tabellini (2008).
19costly, then selection favors short-cuts to learning. Individuals, rather than using scarce resources
to acquire all of the information needed for every decision to be made, will instead develop
‘rules-of-thumb’. These short-cuts or norms of behavior allows individuals to free-ride on the
learning of others. These short-cuts then become internalized as individuals come to believe that
certain behaviors are the ‘right’ behaviors in certain situations.
The idea that norms of behavior may be a channel through which history can affect long-term
economic development is not new. One of the most famous links between history, culture, and
development is Max Weber’s (1930) hypothesis that the Protestant Reformation was instrumental
in facilitating the rise of industrial capitalism in Western Europe. He argues that Protestantism, in
contrast to Catholicism, approved the virtues of hard work and the accumulation of wealth, and
that these values, referred to as the “Protestant work ethic”, provided the moral foundation that
spurred the transition to a modern market based industrial economy. A more recent example is
Mokyr’s (2008) argument that an important determinant of the Industrial Revolution was the de-
velopment of a social norm he calls ‘gentlemanly culture’ that emphasized honesty, commitment,
and cooperation.
Empirical studies exploring the link between history and culture typically attempt to isolate
culture by comparing the some measure or proxy of a cultural belief across individuals in the same
external environment. If individuals’ stated beliefs or actions vary in a systematic manner when
faced with the same situation, then this provides suggestive evidence of the importance of culture.
This logic builds on earlier studies that attempt to identify the existence of cultural differences
between groups. In this literature, two strategies are employed in an attempt to identify systematic
differences in behavior among individuals in the same environment. The ﬁrst strategy is to bring
the same environment to people of different backgrounds. This is the strategy undertaken in the
studies by Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Gintis, McElreath, and Fehr (2001) and Henrich, Boyd,
Bowles, Gintis, Fehr, Camerer, McElreath, Gurven, Hill, Barr, Ensminger, Tracer, Marlow, Patton,
Alvard, Gil-White, and Henrich (2005) where the ultimatum game was conducted in 15 extremely
remote small-scale societies across the world. The second strategy that has been employed is to
examine situations where individuals from different backgrounds have been brought into the same
environment. Miguel and Fisman (2007) look for a culture of corruption using the accumulation of
unpaid parking violations among foreign diplomats stationed in Manhattan. Following a similar
logic, Miguel, Saiegh, and Satyanath (2008) seek to identify the existence of a culture of violence
20by examining the number of yellow and red cards fouls given to soccer players from different
countries playing in six professional soccer leagues. Fernandez and Fogli (2007) examine the
behavior of individuals whose parents were born in different countries, but today live in the
UnitedStates. Theyﬁndthatthelaborforceparticipationandfertilityofsecondgenerationfemales
are positively correlated with the historic labor force participation and fertility of the individual’s
country of ancestry.
The earliest studies examining the possibility that cultural norms may be historically deter-
mined use an experimental setting to control for the external environment of individuals. Psy-
chologists Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, and Schwarz (1996) test whether in the U.S. South there is a
‘culture of honor’, where a special importance is placed in defending one’s reputation and honor,
even if this requires aggression and violence. Their explanation for why this culture exists in the
U.S. South and not the North lies in the different histories of settlement in the two areas. The
North was settled by groups with a farming background, while the South was settled primarily
by the Celts which had been herders since prehistoric times and had never engaged in large-scale
agriculture. They argue that historically in herding cultures, with their low population densities
and weak states, protection of one’s property was left to the individual. The result of this is that
some aspects of the norms of aggressive behavior that were developed as a means to protect one’s
herds continue to persist today.
To test the culture of honor hypothesis, Cohen et al. (1996) conducted a series of experiments
involving white males from the U.S. North and South. In the experiments, each individual was
bumped by an accomplis and called an “asshole”. (The participants did not know this was
part of the experiment.) Cohen et al., using a number of methods including direct observation,
psychological tests, and saliva tests, compare the effects of this incident on Southerners relative
to Northerners. They ﬁnd the Southerners became more upset, were more likely to feel that their
masculinity was threatened, became more physiologically and cognitively primed for aggression
as measured by a rise in testosterone and cortisol levels, and were more likely to engage in
aggressive behavior subsequently.
Another study, which is well-known study in the sociology literature, is Salaman’s (1980)
comparison of two similar towns located in the same county in Eastern Illinois. Both towns were
settled about 100 years ago, but one was settled by German immigrants from East Frisia and the
other by Irish immigrants. Using survey data, Salaman documents the persistent of norms relating
21to land inheritance, which reﬂect the ethnic heritage of the two communities.
Avner Greif (1994), relying on game theory and historic evidence, examines the historical ori-
gins of the divergent evolution of collectivist and individualist cultures among the Genoese and
Maghribis, respectively. Relyingonqualitativehistoricalevidence, Greifarguesthatthedifferences
between the two groups have their origins in the different enforcement strategies undertaken by
merchants towards overseas agents during long-distance medieval trade. Among the Maghribi,
merchants relied on a collective enforcement strategy, where all merchants collectively punish any
agent who had cheated. Among the Genoese, enforcement was achieved through an individual
punishment strategy (Greif, 1993).
Although these pioneering studies provide scarce evidence supporting the role of norms as a
channel through which history matters, the shortcoming of each study is that only two groups are
being compared. Although the studies by Cohen et al. (1996), Salaman (1980), and Greif (1994)
carefully document differences between the two groups being examined, the studies are unable
to prove that the source of these difference is the historical channel being examined. In all three
examples, the two groups being examined differ along many dimensions other than the historic
dimension under consideration. Because of this, one cannot conclude that the cultural differences
observed today do not arise as a result of other factors.
More recent studies attempt to use the same comparative logic of these early studies, but extend
the sample to include many more observations. By doing this, more sophisticated statistical
techniques can be employed to help identify with greater certainty the importance of history in
determining current cultural norms of behavior. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) empirically
examine the well-know hypothesis put forth by Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993) that within
Italy city states that became independent during the 1000–1300 period developed higher level of
social capital and these higher levels of social capital continue to persist today. The authors bring
Putnam et al.’s hypothesis to the data by collecting various city level measures of social capital.
They show that looking across 400 Italian cities, there is a positive relationship between their
measures of social capital and whether the city was free in 1176.
The core issue when interpreting this correlation is that these independent cities may also be
different along many other dimensions which may also affect social capital today. In an attempt to
overcome this identiﬁcation issue, the authors rely on historically motivated instrumental vari-
ables. Motivated by the historic fact that after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, local
22autonomy was often formed around existing religious authorities, the authors use whether a town
had a local bishop in the 5th century as one instrument. Their second instrument is motivated
by the author’s argument that a city that was a part of the Etruscan civilization during the 8th
century was more likely to have become an independent city during the Middle Ages. Using these
instruments, the authors provide IV estimates that are consistent with their OLS estimates.
The authors also use the historic presence of the Norman Kingdom in the South of Italy to
develop a falsiﬁcation test to assess the validity of their instruments. Because of the Norman
Kingdom in the South of Italy, Southern cities were unable to gain independence. Using the ﬁrst
stage estimates from their IV procedure, the authors derive, for each Southern city, the predicted
probability of its being free if it wasn’t located in the South. They show that among these Southern
cities, this predicted probability is uncorrelated with their measures of social capital. The authors
argue that this result provides suggestive evidence that the exclusion restrictions for their IV esti-
mates are satisﬁed. Having a local bishop during the Holy Roman Empire and being an Etruscan
city does not appear to have an effect on social capital in the South, where their potential effect
through independence was shut down historically. If the relationship between their instruments
and social capital was because of a correlation with factors other than independence, then one
would also expect to ﬁnd a similar relationship in Southern Italy.
The recent study by Guido Tabellini (2007) also considers the historical origins of norms of
behavior, but is interested in using this relationship to identify the causal effect of norms on
economic development. His analysis examines differences in trust in others, respect for others, and
conﬁdence in the beneﬁt of individual effort across regions within Europe. Using an IV estimation
strategy to isolate exogenous’ variation in cultural norms, Tabellini uses two historically based
instruments: (i) the literacy rate at the end of the 19th century, and (ii) the political institutions in
place over the past several centuries. According to the ﬁrst stage estimates, European regions with
historically lower literacy and less well developed institutions today have less trust in others, less
respect for others, and less conﬁdence in the beneﬁt of individual effort. The second stage of the IV
estimates report a positive effect of the measured norms on current per capita income levels and
average annual growth between 1977 and 2001.
Although the instruments are relevant, it is less clear whether the necessary exclusion restric-
tions are satisﬁed. The historic variables may have affected the evolution of factors other than
cultural norms. Tabellini clearly understands this concern and controls for a variety of factors
23including current literacy, current political institutions, and the historic urbanization rate. He also
controls for the capital stock and the sectoral composition of employment in the 1970s, arguing that
these are also possible channels through which the historic variables may affect current economic
development. The extent to which one takes the estimates as causal rather than correlations
observed in the data is clearly a matter of individual judgement based on the plausibility of the
identiﬁcation strategy.
Like Tabellini (2007), Nunn and Wantchekon (2008) also consider the historical determinants of
trust, but in a very different environment. The authors examine whether the trans-Atlantic and
Indian Ocean slave trades were responsible for a culture of mistrust within Africa. This is done by
combining survey data from the 2005 Afrobarometer with estimates of the number of slaves taken
from each ethnic group in Africa. The study ﬁnds a very strong negative relationship between an
individual’s reported trust in others and the number of slaves taken from the individual’s ethnic
group during the slave trades. As always, the core concern with this correlation is the non-random
nature of the selection of the historic event. To better understand whether the relationship is
causal, the authors instrument for slave exports using the historic distance from the coast of each
individual’s ethnic group, while controlling for each individual’s current distance from the coast.
The IV results conﬁrm the OLS estimates. They also perform a number of falsiﬁcation tests, the
results of which suggest that the instrument’s exclusion restrictions are likely satisﬁed.
The study then attempts to distinguish between the two most plausible channels through which
the slave trade could have adversely affected trust. One channel is that the slave trade altered the
cultural norms of the ethnic groups exposed to the trade, making them inherently less trusting.
A second channel is that the slave trade resulted in a long-term deterioration of the legal and
political institutions, and these weak institutions cause individuals to be less trusting of others. To
distinguish between these two channels, the authors construct a second measure of slave exports,
which is the average number of slaves that were taken from the geographic location that each
individual is currently living in. This is different from the ﬁrst measure, which is the average
number of slaves taken from an individual’s ethnic group.22
Identiﬁcation between the two channels is based on the fact that when an individual relocates
the individual’s internal norms move with them, but the individual’s external institutional en-
22Both measures are averages over a given land area. Because the two variables are measured in the same units, if the
individual lives in the same location as his ancestors the two variables will take on the same value.
24vironment is left behind. In other words, institutions, which are external to the individual, are
much more geographically ﬁxed, relative to cultural beliefs which are internal to the individual.
Therefore, if one accepts that the slave trade had a causal effect on trust, then the two variables
can be used distinguish to which extent the slave trade affects trust through the culture channel
and through the institutions channel. If the slave trade affects trust primarily through internalized
norms and cultural beliefs, which are ethnically based and internal to the individuals, then when
looking across individuals what should matter is whether their ancestors were heavily enslaved.
If the slave trade affects trust primarily through its deterioration of domestic institutions, which
are external to the individual and geographically immobile, then what should matter is whether
the external environment the individual is living in was heavily affected by the slave trades.
The empirical results provide evidence consistent with the slave trades adversely affecting
trust through both cultural norms and institutions, but the magnitude of the culture channel is
approximately twice the magnitude of the institutions channel. This result is signiﬁcant because it
provides one of the ﬁrst pieces of evidence attempting to quantifying the impact of a historic event
through both its effect on institutions and on its effect on culture.
Although, there has been a recent surge in papers seeking to test whether norms of behavior are
one channel through which history matters, the literature is still very young and still very far from
developing a clear understanding about norms. For example, we still do not understand a number
of very fundamental and important issues related to history, norms, and economic development.
In what environments do norms be changed and when do they tend to persist? Which norms are
more persistent and which are more prone to change? What is the relationship between norms and
institutions? How do the two interact? Are they complements or substitutes?
D. Knowledge and Technology
A number of studies have hypothesized that knowledge, education and technology may also be
channels through which historic events have long-term impacts. Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) conjecture that part of the positive relationship between European
settlement and economic growth documented by Acemoglu et al. (2001) may reﬂect the knowl-
edge and “know how” brought by the settlers to the colony. Although their study is unable to
provide causal evidence proving their hypothesis, it does highlight correlations in the data that
are consistent with their view. Using OLS estimates the authors show that across countries, school
25enrollment in 1900 is positively correlated with income in 2000, and that a country’s initial settler
mortality rate is strongly correlated with schooling in 1900. The authors also examine panel data
over ﬁve year intervals between 1960 and 2000. They ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between
initial education and the subsequent ﬁve year change in democracy.23 However, in a subsequent
study, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2005b) show that this result is driven by the
worldwideincreaseinaverageeducationanddemocracythathasoccurredbetween1960and2000.
Once one includes time period ﬁxed effects, then the correlation disappears.
Evidence from other studies also provide evidence consistent with education being a channel
through which historic events affect long-term development. A recent study by sociologist Robert
Woodberry (2004) documents correlations between measures of the historic presence of missionar-
ies and current per capita income and democracy across former non-settler colonies. Woodberry
argues that the historical presence of missionaries, particularly protestant missionaries, resulted
in a number of beneﬁts for the native populations, such as increased education and a decrease in
injustice and abuse by the colonizers. Because these abuses angered the indigenous populations,
making missionary work more difﬁcult, missionaries had an incentive to ﬁght against these in-
justices. According to Woodberry, these consequences in turn served to promote democracy after
independence.
As well, Huillery’s (2008a) ﬁnding that in French West Africa differences in colonial investments
in schooling can still be observed today also provides some evidence that consistent with a per-
sistent impact of education. Similarly, Bolt and Bezemer (2008) also show that there is a positive
correlation between colonial education levels and current income across African countries.
As Glaeser et al. (2004) acknowledge, their analysis (as well as the other studies cited here) are
unable to prove the primacy of education as a fundamental factor affecting long-term develop-
ment. The primary difﬁculty is establishing a causal link. Both the demand for and the supply
of education are potentially endogenous to a large number of factors, including the quality of
domestic institutions. Countries with better institutions also tend to have better governments
that provide a higher level of public goods, including education. As well, countries with better
institutions tend to have more secure property rights, which raises the returns to investments,
including human capital investments. Therefore, when examining correlations between colonial
23For additional evidence on the possible link between education and democratic institutions also see Glaeser,
Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2006).
26education and current economic development, it is possible that this correlation is being driven by
other omitted factors.
Although these studies all focus on the transfer of education and knowledge from Europe to
the colonies, historically, there was also knowledge transfer in the other direction. An example is
the Columbian Exchange. A study by Nunn and Qian (2008) examines one part of this exchange:
the introduction of the potato to the Old World from the New World. Their study estimates the
impact of the new food technology on population growth and development in the Old World. The
authors show that the potato was calorically and nutritionally superior to all Old World crops,
such as wheat, barley, rye, and rice. Because of this, for the parts of the Old World that were
able to adopt the potato, its diffusion from the New World resulted in a large positive shock
to agricultural productivity. The authors use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy and
compare the difference in population growth before introduction relative to the population growth
after introduction between countries that were able to adopt potatoes and those that were not. A
country’s ability to adopt potatoes is measured using GIS based climate and soil data from the
FAO. According to their estimates, the introduction of the potato had a very large positive impact
on population growth, accounting for about a quarter of the observed increase in population after
1700. The authors also ﬁnd that the introduction of the potato spurred economic development,
which they measure by the urbanization rate, but that this effect is felt approximately 100 years
after the increase in population growth.
The recent study by Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2007) providews a unique analysis of the pos-
sible historical persistence and importance of knowledge and technology. The authors document a
positive relationship between historic technology levels (as far back as 1000BC) and current income
per capita across different parts of the world. The authors interpret their ﬁndings using a model
where the stock of existing technology decreases the cost of adopting new technologies, they show
that if a society has a more advanced technology in the past, then because of lower costs to technol-
ogy acquisition, this will increase its stock of technology and income today. Therefore, according
to the model, past technology levels can have a direct causal impact on economic development
today. However, other interpretations of their correlations are also possible. The most obvious is
that the relationship between historic technology and current technology is being driven by some
omitted factor, which tends to persist over time. Viewed in this light, their correlation is not at all
surprisingly, especially given that previous studies have also documented a similar persistence in
27economic and political performance over time. For example, Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman
(2002) empirically document a positive relationship between state antiquity and current economic
performance. The persistence of technology may simply be another manifestation of the persis-
tence of economic performance over long periods of time.
5. The Relationship between History and Geography
An alternative determinant of economic development which is often pitted against history is
geography. Proponents of the geography view argue that unchanging ﬁxed geographic factors,
such as ecology, climate, natural endowments, and the disease environment, are the primary
determinantsoflong-termeconomicdevelopment. Thisviewhasbeenemphasizedbyanumberof
studies that highlight strong statistical correlations between economic development and a variety
of geographic characteristics, such as the climate (Kamarck, 1976), the disease environment (Sachs,
Mellinger, and Gallup, 2001, Sachs and Malaney, 2002), natural openness (Rappaport and Sachs,
2003), and resource endowments (Sachs and Warner, 2001).
An example of the tension between the ‘geography matters’ and the ‘history matters’ views
can be seen if we return to Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) examination of the effects of institutions on
long-term growth.24 In their study, because initial settler mortality is used as an instrument for
domestic institutions to explain the causal effect of institutions on income, the exclusion restriction
that must be satisﬁed is that initial settler mortality only affects current income through its historic
effect on institutions. Jeffrey Sachs (2003), a proponent of the geography view, argues that the IV
estimates are biased because there is a direct and persistent effect of geographic characteristics on
income today. The argument is that areas that had high settler mortality during colonial rule con-
tinue to have deadly disease environments and this results in low income levels today. Therefore,
initial settler mortality is correlated with income through a channel other than institutions and the
exclusion restriction is not satisﬁed.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) clearly understand this concern and address it directly in their study.
TheyarguethattheprimarydiseasesthatkilledEuropeansweremalariaandyellowfever, andthat
these diseases have a limited effect on indigenous populations that have developed immunities to
the diseases. Because of native immunities, it is unlikely that European settler mortality rates are
24This debate often takes the form of ‘geography matters’ versus ‘history matters’. See for example Rodrik, Subrama-
nian, and Trebbi (2004).
28highly correlated with the disease burdens faced by native populations either historically or today.
The authors also show that their results remain robust to the inclusion of a host of controls that
measure geographic characteristics and the local disease environment.
Another piece of evidence of the relative importance of history versus geography has been put
forth by Acemoglu et al. (2002), who document that there has been a ‘reversal of fortunes’ among
countries that were colonized. The countries that were the most prosperous in 1500 are the poorest
countries today.25 They argue that if geography is a fundamental determinant long-term economic
development, then we would not expect this drastic change in the relative prosperity of countries
over time.
Part of the reason for the debate lies in the fact that geography affects human actions in the
past, and it affects human actions today. In other words, in addition to affecting income directly,
geography also inﬂuences history which in turn affects income today. There are many examples
where small and seemingly innocuous geographic differences become magniﬁed through historic
events and as a result end up having large impacts on long-term economic development. One
example is the differences in soil and climate which made plantation agriculture and its reliance
on slavery more or less proﬁtable in different parts of the Americas (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997,
2002). Even more dramatic examples of the effect of geography through history come from Jared
Diamond’s (1997) book Guns, Germs and Steel. The book is devoted to exploring the answer to the
question of why Europeans colonized the rest of the world and not the other way around. The
proximate answer to this question is clear. It is because Europeans had superior technology, such
as guns, swords, and ships. As well, they also brought with them germs with them that killed
large numbers of native populations, particularly in the Americas and Australia. But why did
Europeans have superior technology? And why did their germs kill native populations and not
the other way around?
Diamond’s answer to the ﬁrst question is that the Europe’s technological advantage, which
stems from more complex specialized societies, arose because crops and animals were domesti-
cated earlier and in more varieties than in other parts of the world. Among the nine locations
that food production initially arose, the Fertile Crescent was the ﬁrst and domesticated the most
25Huillery (2008b) tests for a reversal of fortunes within districts of former French West Africa. She does not ﬁnd
any evidence of a reversal at this more micro level. Instead, she ﬁnds that Europeans tended to settle in the initially
more prosperous parts of French West Africa and European settlement exerted a strong positive effect on long-term
development.
29species. Despite its name, the Fertile Crescent was not the most fertile region on earth. Instead,
its advantage lied in its having the largest number of species of wild plants that were suitable for
domestication. Similarly, the Fertile Crescent, and Eurasia more generally, also had the largest
endowment of animals that could be domesticated.
The domestication of plants and animals quickly spread East and West throughout Eurasia, but
diffused much less quickly South to the African continent. This is because when moving East or
West, the length of the day does not change, and the climate is generally not drastically different.
However, this is not true when moving North or South, where the length of the day changes
and the climate typically is very different. More generally, for continents with a North-South
orientation, such as the Americas or Africa, domestication or technological advance tended not to
spread as quickly as in Eurasia with its East-West orientation. Because of the early domestication
of animals in Eurasia, humans lived in close proximity to animals. As a result of this, new animal-
based diseases, such as measles, tuberculosis, inﬂuenza, and smallpox, developed. Over time
genetic resistances to the diseases were developed. The parts of the world without domesticated
animals did not develop these diseases or a genetic resistance to the diseases. This explains why
European diseases decimated native populations and not the other way around.
Overall, Diamond’s explanation for Europe’s global dominance illustrates clearly the large
effects that geography can have through history. The historical origins of European colonization of
the globe lies in two deep determinants: (i) being endowed with wild plants and animals suitable
for domestication, and (ii) being located on a continents with an East-West orientation.
Although Diamond’s analysis provides descriptive evidence showing that geography can have
large impacts through history, it does not provide a quantitative assessment of the relative impor-
tance of the historic effect of geography relative to its direct contemporaneous effect on develop-
ment.26 A recent study by Nunn and Puga (2007) attempts to estimate the magnitude of these two
channels for one geographic characteristic, terrain ruggedness, which is measured as the average
absolute slope of a country’s surface area. The study identiﬁes two channels through which terrain
ruggedness should matter for economic development. One is a direct contemporaneous effect of
ruggedness on income. All else equal, on rugged terrain it is more difﬁcult to build buildings,
roads, bridges and other infrastructure; agriculture and irrigation is also more difﬁcult; and trade
26Olsson and Hibbs Jr. (2005) empirically tests Diamond (1997). Overall, their estimates provide strong support for
his hypotheses.
30is more costly. For these reasons, terrain ruggedness is expected to have a direct negative effect on
income.
The study also identiﬁes a historic effect of terrain ruggedness. During Africa’s slave trade,
societies were able to use rugged terrain to protect and hide from slave raiders and kidnappers.
This allowed individuals, villages, and societies to partially defend against the negative effects
of the slave trades documented in Nunn (2008a). Therefore, for the African continent which
was exposed to the slave trade, ruggedness also had a historic indirect positive effect on income.
Ruggedness allowed areas to escape from the slave trade, thereby increasing long-term economic
growth. Exploiting the fact that the slave trade only affected Africa, Nunn and Puga are able
to estimate the magnitude of both effects of ruggedness. They ﬁnd that the indirect historic
effect of ruggedness is consistently twice the magnitude of the direct contemporaneous effect
of ruggedness, suggesting that for this geographic characteristics, the importance of geography
through history swamps its importance today.
Overall, the body of evidence reviewed here suggests that the largest effects of geography on
current economic development may work through its inﬂuence on past events rather than through
its direct effect on economic outcomes today.
6. Conclusions
The empirical literature examining the relationship between history and current economic devel-
opment has developed considerably in the past years. The main fact established by this literature
is that history matters. A wide variety of papers have documented the important effects that
certain historic events have had on long-term economic development. These studies range from
Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) study showing that colonial rule affected the subsequent development of
domestic institutions and economic development to Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) study that shows
the importance of colonial land revenue systems within India to Nunn’s (2008a) analysis showing
that Africa’s slave trade adversely affected subsequent development.
Although the literature has made considerable progress in showing that history matters, what
remains less well understood are the exact channels of causality through which history matters.
For most of the studies undertaken to date, their greatest shortcomings lie in their inability to
precisely identify the exact mechanism or channel of causality. For example, Nunn’s (2008a) study
of Africa’s slave trade documents the adverse long-term effects of the slave trade, but it is unable
31to identify the precise channels and mechanisms at play. Similarly, Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005)
analysis is unable to pin down the precise channels through which the historical land revenue
system in India, established by the British 150 years ago, continues to have an effect long after
it was abolished. Even in Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) analysis, which identiﬁes a broad cluster of
institutions as the intervening mechanism, this broad cluster remains, by and large, a black box
left to be unpacked. Although the follow-up paper by Acemoglu and Johnson (2004) takes initial
steps in this direction, much remains to be done before this historic channel of causality is clearly
understood.
The most recent studies that rely on micro-level data and analysis (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2008,
Dell, 2008, Huillery, 2008a, Iyer, 2007, Nunn and Wantchekon, 2008) are beginning to identify ﬁner
causal factors and more precise mechanisms. However, since these studies rely on data at a much
more micro level, the scope of their analysis is more limited. For example, it is difﬁcult to know if
the effects of the mita forced labor system convincingly identiﬁed by Dell (2008) are similar to the
effects of other coercive labor systems in other parts of the world. For this reason, as studies
becomes much more focused, evidence from complementary studies from other locations and
times are also needed before one can assess whether speciﬁc results are part of broad systematic
patterns that exist in the data or whether the results are speciﬁc to that environment. For this
reason, although this literature has grown greatly in recent years, many more historic events and
mechanisms left to be examined before we have a clear picture of the overall importance of historic
events and the speciﬁc channels through which they continue to affect economic development
today.
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